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Abstract
Cops and Robbers games have been studied for the last few decades in com-
puter science and mathematics. As in general pursuit evasion games, pursuers
(cops) seek to capture evaders (robbers); however, players move in turn and are
constrained to move on a discrete structure, usually a graph, and know the ex-
act location of their opponent. In 2017, Bonato and MacGillivray [2] presented
a general characterization of Cops and Robbers games in order for them to be
globally studied. However, their model doesn’t cover cases where stochastic
events may occur, such as the robbers moving in a random fashion. In this
paper we present a novel model with stochastic elements that we call a General-
ized Probabilistic Cops and Robbers game (GPCR). A typical such game is one
where the robber moves according to a probabilistic distribution, either because
she is rather lost or drunk than evading, or because she is a robot. We present
results to solve GPCR games, thus enabling one to study properties relating to
the optimal strategies in large classes of Cops and Robbers games. Some classic
Cops and Robbers games properties are also extended.
Keywords: Cops and Robbers games, pursuit games, optimal strategies,
graph theory, stochastic games
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1. Introduction
Cops and Robbers games have been studied as examples of discrete-time
pursuit games on graphs since the publication of Quilliot’s doctoral thesis [29]
in 1978 and, independently, Nowakowski and Winkler’s article [26] in 1983.
Both monographs describe a turn-based game in which a lone cop pursues a
robber on the vertices of a graph. The game evolves in discrete time and with
perfect information. The cop wins if he eventually shares the same vertex as
the robber’s, otherwise, if the play continues indefinitely, the latter wins. A
given graph is copwin if the cop has a winning strategy: for any possible move
the robber makes, the cop has an answer that leads him to eventually catch the
robber (in finite time). As there is no tie, it is always true that one player has
a (deterministic) winning strategy.
Since the first exposition of the game of Cop and Robber, many variants have
emerged. Aigner and Fromme [1] notably presented in 1984 the cop number :
it is the minimal number of cops required on a graph to capture a robber.
Since then, more alternatives have been described, each one modifying one game
parameter or more such as the speed of the players, the radius of capture of the
cops, etc. We refer to Bonato and Nowakowski’s book [4] for a comprehensive
description of these different formulations. The survey on guaranteed graph
searching problems by Fomin and Thilikos [11] is also a great reference on the
subject. In graph searching games, the objective is to capture a fugitive on a
graph. The problems in which the object is always found are called guaranteed.
In 2017 Bonato and MacGillivray [2] presented a first generalization of Cops
and Robbers games that encompasses the majority of the variants described
previously. Indeed, all two-player, turn-based, discrete-time, pursuit games of
perfect information on graphs in which both players play optimally are con-
tained in Bonato and MacGillivray’s model. As such, this model encompasses
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all pursuit games deemed combinatorial (we refer to Conway’s book On Num-
bers and Games [9] for an introduction on the subject of combinatorial games).
Those games include the set of turn-based, perfect information, games played
on a discrete structure without any randomness.
Recently, some researchers such as Prałat and Kehagias [19], Komarov and
Winkler [22] and Simard et al. [31] described a game, called the Cop and Drunk
Robber game, in which the robber walks in a random fashion: each of her
movements is described by a uniform random walk on the vertices of the graph.
In general, this strategy is suboptimal. Since this particular game cannot be
described by Bonato and MacGillivray’s model, it appears natural to seek to
extend their framework to integrate games with random events.
There has also been a recent push towards more game theoretic approaches
to modeling Cops and Robbers games, notably by Konstantinidis, Kehagias and
others (see for example [23, 18, 16, 17, 24]). Our paper can be considered more
in line with this way of treating Cops and Robbers games than more traditional
approaches.
This paper thus presents a model of Cops and Robbers games that is more
general than that of Bonato and MacGillivray. The main objective of this
model is to incorporate games such as the Cop and Drunk Robber game. The
probabilistic nature of this game leads to define a framework different from the
one of Bonato and MacGillivray.
In Cops and Robbers games, one is generally interested in the question
of solving a game. This question is universal to game theory where one de-
fines a solution concept such as the Nash Equilibrium. In Cops and Robbers
games, often-times the cops’ point of view is adopted and one seeks to deter-
mine whether it is feasible, and if so how, for them to capture the robbers. In
stochastic Cops and Robbers games, one can generalize the question to a quan-
titative scale of success: what is the (best) probability for the cops to capture
the robbers, and which strategy reflects it. One can also ask the dual question
of what would be the minimal number of cops required in order to capture the
robbers with some probability. In deterministic games, this graph parameter is
known as the cop number.
One can note that many solutions of Cops and Robbers games share the
same structure, and this is reflected in the fact that they can be solved with a
recursive expression. Indeed, Nowakowski and Winkler [26] in 1983 presented a
preorder relation on vertices, writing x n y when the cop has a winning strategy
in at most n moves if positioned on vertex y, while the robber is on vertex x.
An important aspect of this relation n is that it can be computed recursively
and thus leads to a polynomial time algorithm to compute its values, as well
as the strategy of the cop. This relation was extended 20 years later by Hahn
and MacGillivray [15] in order to solve games of k cops by letting players move
on the graph’s strong product. Clarke and MacGillivray [7] have also defined a
characterization of k-cop-win graphs through a dismantling strategy and studied
the algorithmic complexity of the problem. For a fixed k the problem can be
resolved in polynomial time with degree 2k + 2. On a related note, Kinnersley
[20] proved that it is EXPTIME-complete to determine whether the cop-number
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of a graph G is less than some integer k when both G and k are part of the
input. This shows that Clarke and MacGillivray’s result is somehow optimal.
In games with stochastic components, such order relations can be generalized
by considering the probability of capture, as is done in a recent paper about the
Optimal Search Path (OSP) problem [31]. A recursion wn(x, y) is defined: it
represents the probability that a cop standing on vertex y captures the robber,
positioned on vertex x, in at most n steps. This relation, defined on the Cop
and Drunk Robber game [19, 22, 31], is analogous to Nowakowski and Winkler’s
x n y and is slightly more general as it enables to model the robber’s random
movement. One can wonder up to what point the relation wn can be extended
while preserving its polynomial nature. Theorem 2.13 and Proposition 2.24 give
an answer to this question.
This paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents our model of Cops and
Robbers games, the wn recursion along with some complexity results, notably,
on wn. Stationarity results on wn are also included. Since most Cops and Rob-
bers games are played on graphs, another formulation of our model is presented
on such a structure in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4.
2. An abstract Cops and Robbers game
We now present a general model of Probabilistic Cops and Robbers games;
it is played with perfect information, is turn-based starting with the cops, and
takes place on a discrete structure. From each state/configuration of the game,
after choosing their actions, the cops and robbers will jump to a state according
to their transition matrices, denoted Trob and Tcop. These matrices may encode
probabilistic behaviours: Tcop(s, a, s′)1 is interpreted as the probability that the
cop, starting in s and playing action a, will arrive in s′.
Definition 2.1. A Generalized Probabilistic Cops and Robbers game (GPCR)
is played by two players, the cop team and the robber team. It is given by the
following tuple
G = (S, i0, F,A, Tcop, Trob) , (1)
satisfying
1. S = Scop × Srob × So, the non-empty finite set of states representing the
possible configurations of the game. The sets Scop and Srob hold the possible
cops and robbers positions while So may contain other relevant information
(like whose turn it is).
2. i0 ∈ S is the initial state.
1The notation T (s, a, s′) refers to a transition matrix view. In this way, it corresponds to
annotating the edge [s, s′] of the transition system with an action a and a positive value, the
probability. In the Markov Decision Processes (MDP) community, it is also written Ta(s, s′),
or P(s′|s, a).
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3. F ⊆ S is the set of final (winning) states for the cops.
4. A = Acop ∪ Arob, with Acop and Arob the non-empty, finite sets of actions
of the cops and robbers, respectively.
5. Tcop : S ×Acop × S → [0, 1] is a transition function for the cops, that is,∑
s′∈S Tcop(s, a, s
′) ∈ {0, 1} for all s ∈ S and a ∈ Acop.
When the sum is 1, we say that a is playable in s, and we write Acop(s)
for the set of playable actions for the cops at state s ∈ S. Furthermore,
Tcop also satisfies
• for all s ∈ S, Acop(s) 6= ∅
• if s ∈ F , then Tcop(s, a, s) = 1 for all action a ∈ Acop; hence
Tcop(s, a, s
′) = 0 for all s′ 6= s.
6. Trob is a transition function for the robbers, similar to Tcop. Arob(s) is the
set of playable actions by the robbers in state s ∈ S.
A play of G is an infinite sequence i0a0s1a1s2a2 · · · ∈ (SAcopSArob)ω of states
and playable actions of G that alternates the moves of cop and rob. It thus
satisfies Tcop(sj , aj , sj+1) > 0 for j = 0, 2, 4, . . . and Trob(sj , aj , sj+1) > 0 for
j = 1, 3, 5, . . . . The cops win whenever a final state s ∈ F is encountered,
otherwise the robbers win. A turn is a subsequence of two moves, starting from
cop. We also consider finite plays and we write Gn for the game where plays are
finite with n (complete) turns.
An equivalent formulation for Tcop, and sometimes more handy, is to rather
define Tcop(s, a) as a distribution on S, for an action a playable in s. The
correspondance is Tcop(s, a)(X) =
∑
s′∈X Tcop(s, a, s
′) for X ⊆ S. For example,
the second condition of the fifth item in the preceding definition could have been
stated Tcop(s, a) = δs, where δs is the Dirac distribution on an element s, that
is, δs has value 1 on {s}, and is 0 elsewhere.
A play progresses as follows: from a state s, the cops choose an action
acop ∈ Acop(s), which results in a new state s′, randomly chosen according to
distribution Tcop(s, acop); then the robbers play an action arob ∈ Arob(s′), which
results in the next state s′′, drawn with probability Trob(s′, arob, s′′). Once a final
state is reached, the players are forced to stay in the same state. Notice that
one could record whose turn it is in the third component of the states: So =
{cop, rob}. However, this doubles the state set and complexifies the definition
of the transition function. In most games, it is more intuitive to define the rules
for movement independently of when this transition will be taken, like in chess.
We sometimes use the notation sx, for x ∈ {cop, rob, o} to denote the pro-
jection of a state s ∈ S on the set Sx. The set So is rarely used in the current
section, but will be valuable further on, such as in Example 3.5 on dynamic
graphs whose structures vary with time.
In what follows, we write DistB as the set of discrete distributions on a set
B and UB ∈ DistB for the discrete uniform distribution on the same set.
Most of the example games we will describe will be between a single cop and
a single robber, even if the definition specifies a cop team and a robber team.
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The usual way of presenting the positions of the cop team is with a single vertex
in the strong product of each member’s possible territory.
2.1. Encoding of known games and processes, stochastic or not
We now describe a few known games, following the structure of Defini-
tion 2.1. The first one is a typical, deterministic example of a Cops and Robbers
game. We say a game is deterministic when both distributions defined by Tcop
and Trob are concentrated on a single point, in other words if Tcop(s, a) and
Trob(s, a) are Dirac for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A. The reader can safely skip this
section.
Example 2.2 (Classic Cop and Robber game). Let G = (V,E) be a finite
graph. In this game, both players play alone and walk on the vertices of the
graph, successively choosing their next moves among their neighbourhoods. The
final states are those in which both players share a vertex, in which case the cop
wins. The tricky part for encoding this game is that in their first move, the cop
and the robber can choose whatever vertices they want, so the rule of moving
differs at the first move from the rest of the play. So we let icop, irob /∈ V be two
elements that will serve as starting points for the cop and the robber. Because
the first moves are chosen in turn, the set of states S below must contain states
in V × {irob}, which can only be reached after the cop’s first move, but before
the robber’s. To simplify S, we include states that will not be reached, and this
will be governed by the transition functions. The different sets are:
i0 = (icop, irob)
S = ({icop} ∪ V )× ({irob} ∪ V )
F =
{
(x, x) ∈ V 2}
Acop = V
Arob = V.
Let (c, r) ∈ S, x ∈ V , and actions c′ ∈ Acop and r′ ∈ Arob. We define:
Tcop((c, r), c
′, (x, r)) =
{
1, if x = c′ and c = icop or c′ ∈ N [c],
0, otherwise.
Trob((c, r), r
′, (c, x)) =
{
1, if x = r′ and r = irob or r′ ∈ N [r],
0, otherwise.
Thus, for state (c, r) ∈ S \ {i0}, the playable action set is Acop(c, r) = N [c].
Similarly, for the robber we get Arob(c, r) = N [r]. Because a play starts with
the cop, it is not required to specify the condition c 6= icop in function Trob.
Similarly, is it not necessary to make a special case of state c = r, since the play
ends anyway.
The stochasticity of Definition 2.1 is motivated by the following example,
called the Cop and Drunk Robber game. It is rather similar to the one just
presented except that the robber moves randomly on the vertices of the graph.
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Example 2.3 (Cop and Drunk Robber game). From the preceding ex-
ample, only the robber’s transition function Trob is modified, the rest stays the
same. Let (c, r) ∈ S and r′ ∈ Arob. The robber’s transition function is then:
Trob((c, r), r
′) =
{
δ(c,r′), if r = irob,
U{c}×N [r], otherwise.
The robber, after the first move, moves uniformly randomly on her neighbour-
hood, which amounts to ignoring her action r′ ∈ Arob. One could also restrict
her actions by Arob(s) = {1} when s ∈ S \ {i0}.
In the Cop and Drunk Robber game, the robber moves according to a uni-
form distribution on her neighbourhood. Varying her transition function could
represent various scenarios. For example, the robber’s probability of ending on
a vertex r′ from vertex r could depend on the distance between r and r′.
In addition to the Cop and Drunk Robber game itself, a recent paper by
Simard et al. [31] presented a variant of this game in which the robber can
evade capture. The main difference between these games is that the cop may
not catch the robber even when standing on the same vertex. This game is
presented in the next example.
Example 2.4 (Cop and Drunk Defending Robber). The game’s main
structure is again similar to that of Example 2.2, but we need a jail to simulate
the catch of the robber, j∗ /∈ V . The initial state is the same, and we have:
i0 = (icop, irob)
S = ({icop} ∪ V )× ({irob} ∪ V ) ∪ {(j∗, j∗)}
F = {(j∗, j∗)} .
When players do not meet, they move on G as before. Yet, when the cop steps
on the same vertex v as the robber, there is a probability p(v) the robber gets
captured, where p : V → [0, 1]. For (c, r) 6∈ F , the robber’s transition function
is then:
Trob((c, r), r
′) =

δ(c,r′), if r = irob,
U{c}×N [r], if c 6= r and r 6= irob,
Dr, if c = r and r 6= irob,
where Dr(x) =
{
1−p(r)
|N [r]| , if x ∈ {c} ×N [r] and c = r,
p(r), if x = (j∗, j∗).
When the cop steps on the robber’s vertex (c = r), at the end of his turn, the
next move for the robber follows the distribution Dr. The robber is caught
by the cop with probability p(r), bringing the play in a final state, otherwise
she proceeds as expected: the target state is chosen uniformly randomly in
the robber’s neighbourhood. Variations of this game could be defined through
different distributions for Trob((c, r), r′) with c 6= r. Likewise, in Dr, the factor
1
|N [r]| could be replaced with any distribution on N [r].
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We now present the Cop and Fast Robber game with surveillance zone as
first formulated in Marcoux [25]. This example is reconsidered further on in
Section 3. Chalopin et al. also studied a game of Cop and Fast Robber with the
aim of characterizing graph classes [6].
Example 2.5 (Cop and Fast Robber). This game is similar to the classic
one (Example 2.2) except that the robber is not limited to a single transition.
It has been studied by Fomin et al. [10]. We present a variation where the cop
can capture the robber when she appears in his watch zone, even in the middle
of a path movement. This watch zone can simulate the use of a weapon by the
cop. The states will now contain, in addition to both players’ positions, the set
of vertices watched by the cop. We assume here that the cop’s watch zone is
his neighbourhood, as in Marcoux [25]; Fomin et al.’s version is retrieved with a
watch zone consisting of a single vertex, the cop’s position. In the initial state,
the cop’s watch zone is empty since the robber cannot be captured before her
first step. We again use a jail state j∗ /∈ V . When both players find themselves
there, the game ends and the robber has lost. Hence, we let:
i0 = (icop, ∅, irob) with icop, irob /∈ V,
F = {(j∗, ∅, j∗)} ,
S = ({(icop, ∅)} ∪ {(c,N [c]) | c ∈ V })× ({irob} ∪ V ) ∪ F
Let (c, C, r) ∈ S be the current state and c′ ∈ N [c] an action of the cop. Here
is the cop’s transition function, for (c, C, r) 6∈ F :
Tcop((c, C, r), c
′) =

δ(c′,N [c′],r), if c = icop and c′ ∈ V or
if c ∈ V and c′ ∈ N [c],
0, otherwise.
As in the classic game, the cop can jump to any vertex in his first move; after
that he moves in the neighbourhood of his current position. His watch zone
then changes to N [c′]. We use C as watch zone in this definition to emphasize
the fact that it does not influence the cop’s next state. On her turn, on vertex
r1 ∈ V , the robber’s action consists in choosing a path pi = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) of
finite length n > 0, that is, [ri, ri+1] is an edge in E for each i = 1, 2, . . . . The
robber’s transition function is:
Trob((c, C, r1), pi) =

δ(c,C,rn), if r1 = irob and rn ∈ V \N [c], or
if r1 ∈ V and ri /∈ C, for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
δ(j∗,∅,j∗), otherwise.
The robber is thus ensured to reach her destination rn provided that she never
crosses the cop’s watch zone on her path pi. If this happens, then the robber is
taken to the jail state (j∗, ∅, j∗).
In Section 3, we present this game again, but with the possibility for the
robber to evade capture.
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Hence, because of Definition 2.1’s rather general description, it is possible to
encode a great variety of random events resulting from the cops’ or the robbers’
actions. In the following example, we encode a simple inhomogeneous Markov
Chain by forgetting the notions of cop. This makes the example fairly degenerate
but it also shows the generality of Definition 2.1.
Example 2.6 (Finite Markov chain). A Markov chain is a sequence of
random variables X0, X1, . . . on a space E, having the Markov property. So we
can assume that the evolution is given by an initial distribution q on E and a
family of matricesM0,M1, . . . , whereMi(s, s′) is the probability that Xi+1 = s′
given that Xi = s. We can encode it as a GPCR game from Definition 2.1. In
previous examples, we have ignored the third component of states, So, but here
we can ignore one of the players sets, like Srob; equivalently, we can assume a
single state for the robber and no effect by Trob. We define
i0 /∈ E
S = I ∪ (E × N)
F = ∅
A = {1}
Tcop(i0, 1, (e, 0)) = q(e)
Tcop((e, j), 1, (e
′, j + 1)) = Mj(e, e′).
Since the action of the player has no influence on the progress of the game, it
is natural to define A as a singleton. Technically, a play alternates between the
moves of cops and robbers, so it is a sequence i01(e0, 0)1(e0, 0)1(e1, 1)1(e1, 1) . . . ;
the repetitions reflect the fact that the robber has no effect. If we ignore the
useless information of such a play, we obtain a sequence i0e0e1e2 . . . , which is
just a walk in the Markov chain (and the robber wins). Another way to write
down this model would have been to let the two players play similarly, with
Trob = Tcop, but the states would then have to be triplets, and the initial state
would force a less simple encoding.
Similarly, we can encode a finite state Markov Decision Process (MDP) with
reachability objectives [28] with Definition 2.1. The encoding will satisfy that
the optimal value of the MDP is 1 if the cops wins, otherwise it is 0, and the
robber wins.
The probabilistic Zombies and Survivors game on graphs [3] can also be
viewed as a GPCR game, one in which only the robbers play optimally. It
models a situation in which a single robber (the survivor) tries to escape a set
of cops (the zombies). However, the cops have to choose their initial vertices
at random and, on each turn, choose randomly among the set of vertices that
minimize the distance to the robber.
2.2. Strategies
A deterministic (or pure) strategy is a function that prescribes to a player
which action to play on each possible game history. Some strategies are better
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than others; we will be interested in the probability of winning for the cops,
which will be attained by following a strategy. Ultimately, we are interested
in memoryless strategies, that is, those that only depend on the present state,
and not on the previous moves; nevertheless, we need to define more general
strategies as well.
Definition 2.7. Let G be a game. A history on G is an initial fragment of a
play on G ending in a state. HG is the set of histories on G.
• the set of general strategies is Ωg = {σ : HG → A}.
• the set of memoryless strategies is Ω = {σ : S → A}.
• the set of finite horizon strategies is Ωf = {σ : (S × N)→ A}.
A finite horizon strategy counts the number of turns remaining, and it is
otherwise memoryless. A finite horizon strategy is conveniently defined on G
but it is actually played on Gn, hence the following definition of how such a
strategy is followed. At turn 0 of h (histories i0 and i0a0s1), there are n turns
remaining, so σ is evaluated with n on the second coordinate of its argument; at
turn 1 (histories i0a0s1a1s2 and i0a0s1a1s2a2s3), there are n−1 turns remaining.
Definition 2.8. Let h = i0a0s1a1s2a2s3 . . . be a (finite or infinite) play of G.
• h follows a general strategy σ ∈ Ωg for the cops if for all j = 0, 2, 4, . . .
we have aj = σ(a0s1a1s2a2s3 . . . sj). Similarly for the robbers.
• h follows a memoryless strategy σ ∈ Ωcop for the cops if for all j =
0, 2, 4, . . . we have aj = σ(sj). Similarly for the robbers.
• h follows a finite horizon strategy σ ∈ Ωfcop on Gn for the cops if for
j = 0, 2, 4, . . . , 2n we have aj = σ(sj , n− j2 )).
• h follows a finite horizon strategy σ ∈ Ωfrob on Gn for the robbers if j =
1, 3, 5, . . . , 2n+ 1 we have aj = σ(sj , n− j−12 ).
These strategies are all deterministic, or pure: a single action is chosen.
Some papers consider mixed or behavioral strategies, where this choice is ran-
domized. This is unnecessary in our setting because, as is well known in perfect
information games, among all optimal strategies, there is always a pure one. We
will come back to this when we study optimal strategies later on.
We now present an example where the optimal strategy for the infinite game
is memoryless (only depends on the states), but, for any finite horizon game Gn,
it is a finite horizon strategy.
Example 2.9. This example is in the spirit of the Cop and Drunk Robber
game, presented in Example 2.3. As in this example, the cop moves on his
neighbourhood and so does the robber, who cannot choose her action, as before,
but the difference with Example 2.3 is that the robber’s movement is not uniform.
The graph is a cycle of length 5. The robber moves clockwise with probability
0.9, and counterclockwise with probability 0.1. If the cop is at distance 1 of
the robber at his turn, of course he wins in this turn. Otherwise, the cop is
at distance 2, more specifically at clockwise distance 2 or 3. Let us focus on
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states s where this clockwise distance is 2 (from the cop to the robber). On the
long term, the cop’s best choice is to move counterclockwise. However, if only
one turn remains, the best move for the cop is the clockwise move because then
with probability 0.1, the robber will jump to his position, whereas the probability
of winning is zero in the counterclockwise direction. So the best strategy σ for
Gn satisfies σ(s, n) 6= σ(s, 1) in such a state s, for n > 1, hence it is not
memoryless. Indeed, for example, σ(s, 2) 6= σ(s, 1) because the probability of
catching the robbers by playing counterclockwise when 2 turns remain is 0.9,
and it is 0.19 by playing clockwise (0.1 in one move of the robber plus 0.09 in
two moves).
2.3. Winning conditions in GPCR games
In this section we are interested in winning strategies for the cops, their
probability of winning in a given number n of turns (that is, in Gn) and their
probability of winning without any limit on the number of turns (in G).
Given finite horizon strategies σcop and σrob, for the cops and for the robbers,
we consider the probability that the robbers are captured in n steps or less:
pn(σcop, σrob) := P [“capture in at most n steps” | σcop, σrob] .
Since the cops want to maximize this probability, and the robbers want to
minimize it, the probability for the cops to win in n turns or less (playing
optimally), whatever the robbers strategy, is:
p∗n := max
σcop∈Ωfcop
min
σrob∈Ωfrob
pn(σcop, σrob). (2)
This is in fact the value of Gn in the sense of game theory. In game theory, the
value for Gn exists if
max
σcop∈Ωgcop
min
σrob∈Ωgrob
pn(σcop, σrob) = min
σrob∈Ωgrob
max
σcop∈Ωgcop
pn(σcop, σrob). (3)
In our setting defining the payoff function of a play as 1 when the robbers are
captured and 0 otherwise, we have, by Wal and Wessels [33], that the game Gn
has value p∗n. That the restriction of p∗n to finite horizon strategies does achieves
the value of Gn is given again by Wal and Wessels, who call such strategies
Markov strategies. Finally, since Gn is finite and with perfect information, a
standard game-theoretical argument [27] justifies that the optimal strategies
are deterministic (or pure).
We say that the cops and the robbers play optimally in Gn if they each follow
a strategy that yields probability p∗n for the cops to win. We will show later
on, but it is also straightforward2 from the definition, that p∗n is increasing in
n; since it is moreover bounded by 1, the limit always exists and we will prove
that is it equal to the value of G.
2This can be proven by induction, since for n+1 the cops can choose their optimal strategy
for n and simply do anything on the last turn.
11
Indeed, from a known result in Simple Stochastic Games (SSG), one can
show that G has a value and that this value is achieved by a pair of optimal
strategies that are deterministic (or pure) and memoryless. The argument is
well known in the literature on SSGs, but requires a construction, so we leave
it to Appendix A. Thus, let us write the value of game G as p∗G , that is,
p∗G = max
σcop∈Ωc
min
σrob∈Ωr
P [“capture in a play” | σcop, σrob] , (4)
and the equality still holds when the min and max operators are switched.
This value is guaranteed by Theorem A.1 [8, 30]. In Proposition 2.16, we will
show that the difference in the cop using a finite-horizon strategy in Gn and a
memoryless one in G is negligible for a sufficiently large integer n.
Equation (2) returns either 0 or 1 in deterministic games such as the Classic
Cop and Robber game. We seek here to study games that can be stochastic,
where p∗n can take any value in [0, 1]. Thus, we adapt the usual definition of
copwin to our broader model.
Definition 2.10. Let G be a GPCR game. We say G is
• c(p, n)-win if the cops can ensure a win with probability at least p in at
most n turns, that is p∗n ≥ p;
• p-copwin if it is c(p, n)-win for some n ∈ N;
• almost surely copwin if the cops can win when they are allowed to play
infinitely, that is p∗G = 1;
• copwin if it is c(1, n)-win for some n ∈ N.
It is easy to see that when G corresponds to the Classic Cop and Robber
game, as defined in Example 2.2, this definition of copwin coincides with the
classical one. In that sense, it can be considered as a generalization of the
classical one, because in any copwin finite graph, the cop wins in at most n =
|V (G)|2 turns.
Remark 2.11. We will see in Proposition 2.16 that limn→∞ p∗n = p∗G. Thus,
if there exists n such that p∗n > 0 and if all states reachable within a finite
number of moves of the cop’s optimal strategy are in the same strongly connected
component, then p∗G = 1. Indeed, after n turns, if the play is not over, the
cops can go back to the configuration where p∗n > 0: the initial position that
is proposed by the cops’ strategy. In that state, the probability that the robbers
have not been caught is at most 1 − p∗n; the probability that the robbers are not
caught after m repetition of this cycle is at most (1 − p∗n)m. It is thus zero at
the limit. This happens, for example, if p∗n > 0 and G is a strongly connected
graph. However, we cannot, in general, claim that if p∗n > 0 after n > |S| turns
have been played, then p∗G = 1.
We define a probabilistic analog to the cop number, c(G), which is the
minimal number of cops required on a graph G in order for the cops to cap-
ture the robbers. It is an important subject of research in Classic Cops and
Robbers games [4], in particular relating to Meyniel’s conjecture that c(G) ∈
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O
(√|V (G)|). Furthermore, one of the main areas of research on cops and
robbers games that involve random events is the expected capture time of the
robbers [22, 21, 19]. Thus, we further generalize the expected capture time of
the robbers for any game G.
Adding cops in a game G is done in the natural way. The set of cops states
Scop is the cartesian product of the sets of single cop positions, and the transition
function is updated so as to let all cops move in one step.
Definition 2.12. The (p, n)-cop number cnp (G) of a game G is the minimal
number of cops required for the capture of the robbers in at most n turns with
probability at least p. In other words, cnp (G) is the minimal number of cops
required for a game G to be c(p,n)-win. The p-cop number, cp(G) = c∞p (G), is
the minimal number of cops necessary for having p∗G ≥ p.
Let T pG be the random variable giving the number of turns required for the
robbers to be captured with probability at least p in G under optimal strategies.
Then, the p-expected capture time of the robbers is E
[
T pG
]
. The expected capture
time of the robbers is E
[
T 1G
]
.
Since some of the optimal strategies of G are memoryless, we can turn the
question of computing E
[
T pG
]
into a question of computing an expected hitting
time in a Markov chain. Let us write σ∗cop (σ∗rob) for the optimal strategy of
the cops (robbers) in G and let M be the Markov chain such that for any
state s ∈ S, it has two states (s, σ∗cop(s)) and (s, σ∗rob(s)). Furthermore, let M
be its transition matrix, that is governed by the distributions Tcop(s, σ∗cop(s))
and Trob(s, σ∗rob(s)). Suppose (Xn)n≥0 describes the stochastic process on M
beginning at the initial state i0, then T := 12 minn≥0(Xn ∈ F ) is the hitting
time of F from i0. The expectation of T is E
[
T 1G
]
.
2.4. Solving GPCR games
Similarly as with Bonato and MacGillivray’s model, we define a method for
solving GPCR games, that is, for computing the probability for the cops to
capture the robbers in an optimal play, and the strategy to follow. This method
takes the form of a recursion, defining the probability wn(s) that state s leads
to a final state in at most n steps (w is for winning in the following theorem).
This recursion gives a strategy for the cops.
Theorem 2.13. Let G be a GPCR game, and let:
w0(s) :=
{
1, if s ∈ F,
0, otherwise.
wn(s) := 1, if s ∈ F,max
a∈Acop(s′)
∑
s′∈S
Tcop(s, a, s
′) min
a′∈Arob(s′)
∑
s′′∈S
Trob(s
′, a′, s′′)wn−1(s′′), otherwise. (5)
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Then wn(s) gives the probability for the robbers to be captured in n turns or less,
given that both players play optimally, starting in state s. Thus,
wn(i0) = p
∗
n.
This also says that G is c(p, n)-win if and only if wn(i0) ≥ p. For (s, k) ∈ S×N,
let σ∗cop(s, k) be the argmax in place of max in Equation (5). This defines finite
horizon strategies that are optimal in Gn3.
The recursive part of wn’s definition is as follows: to win, the cops must
take the best action a; this leads them to state s′ with probability Tcop(s, a, s′);
from this state, the robbers must choose the action a′ that will give them the
smallest probability of being caught. Action a′ leads the robbers to state s′′
with probability Trob(s′, a′, s′′) and then we multiply by the probability that the
cops catch the robbers from this state, wn−1(s′′). Since the cops want a high
probability, a maximum is taken; it is the converse for the robbers. The full
equation gives the expected probability of capture of the robbers by the cops
when both players move optimally.
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. We prove that wn(s) gives the probability
for the robbers to be captured in n turns or less, given that both players play
optimally, starting in state s. Let s be any state.
If n = 0, then the cops win if and only if s ∈ F , in which case, by definition
we do have w0(s) = 1. Otherwise the robbers win and w0(s) = 0, as wanted.
If n > 0, suppose the result holds for n − 1 ≤ k and let s be the current
state. If this state is final, then the robbers are caught in n turns or less with
probability 1 and wn(s) = 1 as desired. Otherwise, let the cops, playing first,
choose an action acop ∈ Acop(s), after what the next state s′ is drawn according
to Tcop(s, acop, s′). Then, the robbers can choose an action arob ∈ Arob(s′), in
which case the next state s′′ will be drawn with probability Trob(s′, arob, s′′). By
the induction hypothesis, we know a final state will be encountered in n−1 turns
or less with probability wn−1(s′′) starting from state s′′. Thus, the probability
the robbers are caught in n turns or less by playing action arob after the cops
have reached state s′ is given by:∑
s′′∈S
Trob(s
′, arob, s′′)wn−1(s′′).
Note that if s′ ∈ F , this value is exactly wn−1(s′), since by definition, we must
have Trob(s′, arob, s′′) = 1 if s′′ = s′ and 0 otherwise. The robbers wish to
minimize this value among their set of available actions, which is possible since
both sets S and Arob are finite. Hence, supposing action acop ∈ Acop(s) has been
chosen by the cops, the game stochastically transits to some other state s′ ∈ S
with probability Tcop(s, acop, s′). Thus, with probability∑
s′∈S
Tcop(s, acop, s
′) min
arob∈Arob(s′)
∑
s′′∈S
Trob(s
′, arob, s′′)wn−1(s′′),
3The argmax is not necessary unique.
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the robbers are caught in at most n turns from state s, when the cops play
action acop. The cops want to maximize this value and, as for the robbers, this
is possible because the considered sets are finite. Thus, the cops must play the
action
argmax
acop∈Acop(s)
∑
s′∈S
Tcop(s, acop, s
′) min
arob∈Arob(s′)
∑
s′′∈S
Trob(s
′, arob, s′′)wn−1(s′′).
The claim about σ∗cop is straightforward from this result. The choices of actions
at the initial state thus give the probability wn(i0). Because p∗n is, by definition,
the probability of capture of the robbers in n turns or less when both players
play optimally, we conclude that wn(i0) = p∗n.
This result implies that the wn’s are probabilities that increase with n. In
other words, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.14. For any n ∈ N, s ∈ S we have 0 ≤ wn(s) ≤ wn+1(s) ≤ 1.
Note that there are many optimal strategies for the cops in G, that is, state-
gies that have value p∗n, but they are not all as efficient. Consider a game Gn
where the robbers can be caught in k < n turns with probability 1, and let
σk be an optimal strategy for Gk. Then the strategy that stays idle for n − k
turns and then behave as prescribed by σk is optimal, but not efficient, and it
respects the argmax of Equation (5). The next proposition shows how to define
an efficient one.
Proposition 2.15. For each N ∈ N, there exists an optimal strategy σ∗N with
horizon N that satisfies: for all s ∈ S, if wN1(s) = wN2(s) for N1 ≤ N2 ≤ N ,
then σ∗N (s,N1) = σ
∗
N (s,N2). Similarly for the robbers.
Proof. For any (s,m) ∈ S × N, we denote by ACT(s,m) the set of actions
that achieve the maximum in Equation (5) for wm(s). We have proved in
Theorem 2.13 that any strategy satisfying σ(s,m) ∈ ACT(s,m) for all (s,m) ∈
S × N is optimal. Let us prove that if wN1(s) = wN1+1(s) for N1 ∈ N, then
ACT(s,N1) ⊆ ACT(s,N1 + 1). By contradiction let k be the smallest integer
such that there is a state s and an action a ∈ ACT(s, k) \ ACT(s, k + 1). By
induction, the cops play action a at time k + 1, and then, with horizon k, they
choose an optimal action in σ∗k−1 that is also in σ
∗
k (possible by minimality of
k) and so on until the last turn where they stay in place or whatever possible.
This gives us a value of at least wk(s) and, by definition, at most wk+1(s). Since
wk(s) = wk+1(s), the finite horizon strategy defined above is optimal. This is
a contradiction since a should be in ACT(s, k + 1). Thus we obtain that if
wN1(s) = wN2(s) for N1 ≤ N2 ≤ N , then ACT(s,N1) ⊆ ACT(s,N2), for all
N1 ≤ N2 ≤ N . Hence the wanted strategy exists. The argument is similar for
the robbers.
Although wn(i0) only gives the value of the game Gn with finite-horizon
strategies, we can show that this relation, as a function of n, converges to the
value of G.
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Proposition 2.16. The value of G is limn→∞ p∗n. Furthermore, the optimal
strategies of Gn are -optimal strategies of G for any  > 0 and sufficiently large
integer n.
Proof. From a previous argument, we know that some pair (sc, sr) of optimal
memoryless strategies for the cops and the robbers yields a probability p∗G of
winning for the cops. It holds that p∗n ≤ p∗G , for any integer n, since the value
of Gn can only be at most the value of G. Recall that since p∗n is non-decreasing
in n and bounded above by p∗G , we have that limn→∞ p
∗
n ≤ p∗G .
Now, let us play strategies (sc, sr), chosen above, in the game Gn for any
integer n. Consider the probability that the cops win in Gn when both play-
ers follow those strategies. These probabilities, for each n, form a sequence
(vn)n∈N := (v1, v2, . . . ). This sequence is non-decreasing and bounded above by
p∗G .
Let An be the event “there is a capture in at most n turns under strategies
sc and sr”. Observe that A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . is a non-decreasing sequence. Thus,
by the Monotone Convergence Theorem:
p∗G = P [{h | h is a play following sc, sr where cops win}]
= P [∪∞i=0Ai]
= lim
n→∞P [An]
= lim
n→∞ vn.
Thus, for any  > 0 there exists an integerN such that for all n ≥ N , p∗G−vn < .
But, we also have that vn ≤ p∗n for any integer n, since wn(i0) is the value of Gn.
Hence, it follows that 0 < p∗G − p∗n ≤ p∗G − vn =
∣∣p∗G − vn∣∣ < . This completes
the proof.
It is interesting to note that this theorem only applies if there are best
strategies for the cops and robbers. In particular, it is not true if G is played on
the infinite graph of the following example.
Example 2.17. Consider an infinite star graph with a central vertex, from
which paths of lengths n are deployed, for every integer n, and consider the
Classic Cops and Robbers game G on this graph with one cop and one robber.
The best move for the cop is to start on the (infinitely branching) central vertex.
Then whatever state the robber chooses, the cop will catch her in a finite number
of turn, so this graph is copwin in the sense of Definition 2.10. However this
number of turn is unbounded, so when playing in Gn, the robber can simply
choose a vertex at distance greater than n; so the value of Gn is 0 for all n. The
proof of the theorem fails in that case because, the graph being infinite, there is
no optimal strategy for the robber in G. Whatever state the robber chooses, there
is always a further state that would allow her to be captured in more turns, that
is, there is always a better strategy.
Under certain conditions that will be further studied in Subsection 2.6, the
(wn)n∈N sequence becomes constant.
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Definition 2.18. We say that (wn)n∈N is stationary if there exists an integer
N ∈ N such that wn(s) = wn+1(s), for all n > N , s ∈ S. We write w for the
stationary part of (wn)n∈N.
Remark 2.19. It follows from the definition of wn that, if for some N , wN (s) =
wN+1(s) for all s ∈ S, then (wn)n∈N is stationary and w starts at n = N or
less.
From Theorem 2.13, we deduce Theorem 2.20 that is more in line with
traditional game theoretical arguments and show that in addition to the equality
limn→∞ wn(i0) = p∗G we can compute explicitly the optimal strategy of the cops
in G, from the limit of the wn’s.
Theorem 2.20. The (point-wise) limit w∞ := limn→∞ wn exists and it satisfies
w∞(s) = 1, if s ∈ F,max
a∈Acop(s′)
∑
s′∈S
Tcop(s, a, s
′) min
a′∈Arob(s′)
∑
s′′∈S
Trob(s
′, a′, s′′)w∞(s′′), otherwise. (6)
Moreover, the optimal (memoryless) strategy for the cops in G, from any state
s, can be retrieved by a cops’ action for which the maximum of Equation (6) is
achieved.
Proof. Let L be the lattice of functions S → [0, 1], ordered point-wise, with
the null function as bottom element ⊥. Equation (5) determines the following
function F : L→ L. For f : S → [0, 1] and s ∈ S,
F(f)(s) := 1, if s ∈ F,max
a∈Acop(s′)
∑
s′∈S
Tcop(s, a, s
′) min
a′∈Arob(s′)
∑
s′′∈S
Trob(s
′, a′, s′′)f(s′′), otherwise.
From previous remarks, F is monotone increasing. Thus, we deduce from the
Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem [14] that F has a least fixed point given by
w∞ := limn→∞ Fn(⊥). Furthermore, we have F(⊥) = w0 and F(wn−1) = wn,
so Fn+1(⊥) = wn, for all integer n, and thus w∞ = limn→∞ wn and satisfies
Equation (6).
We showed in Theorem 2.13 that wn(i0) = p∗n, and in Proposition 2.16
that limn→∞ p∗n = p∗G . Consequently, w∞(i0) = p
∗
G . Hence, w∞(i0) is the
probability that the cops capture the robbers when both teams play optimally.
Similarly, one can show that w∞(s) is the probability that, starting at s, the
cops capture the robbers when both team play optimally. This, together with
the fact that w∞ satisfies Equation (6), imply that the optimal strategy for the
cop is coherent with an action achieving the argmax operator in place of the
max operator in Equation (6). One cannot choose any such action because, for
example, a temporary bad action, like staying idle, can give the same probability
of winning than another action, but you can only choose it a finite number of
times, which is incompatible with a memoryless strategy.
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Remark 2.21. Recall that we have wn(i0) = p∗n and that, by definition, it holds
that p∗n = minσrob∈Ωgrob maxσcop∈Ωgcop pn(σcop, σrob). Thus, we could have defined
wn(i0) with switched operators min and max. Then, we can deduce the optimal
robbers strategies by flipping those operators and replacing the min operator by
an argmin operator. This also holds in w∞.
Now, with the help of Equation (5) we can generalize the classic theorem of
Cops and Robbers games. This is done in the next corollary.
Corollary 2.22. Let G be a GPCR game. Then, G is copwin if and only if the
sequence (wn)n∈N is stationary and
w(i0) = 1.
Moreover, the game is p-copwin if and only if the sequence is stationary and
w(i0) ≥ p.
If G is not p-copwin for any p, then the game is almost surely copwin if and
only if the sequence is not stationary and
w∞(i0) = 1.
Remark 2.23. If the GPCR game G is deterministic, then wn(s) is 0 or 1 for
any n ∈ N and s ∈ S. It therefore follows from monotonicity of (wn)n∈N (see
Corollary 2.14) and from Remark 2.19 that the stationary part starts at some
N ≤ |S|. Indeed, if wn 6= wn+1 there is at least one s such that wn(s) = 0 and
wn+1(s) = 1. This difference can be observed at most |S| times.
The conditions under which (wn)n∈N is stationary are presented in Proposi-
tion 2.26.
2.5. The computational complexity of the wn recursion
We show a result on the algorithmic complexity of computing function wn
(Equation (5)). This function is computable with dynamic programming, yet it
may require a high number of operations, especially as its complexity is function
of the size of the state space. Recall that Equation (5) was devised to be as
general and efficient as possible. However, given the context of Definition 2.1,
the best one can hope for its polynomial complexity in the size of the state and
action spaces.
Proposition 2.24. In the worst case and under a dynamic programming ap-
proach, computing wn requires O
(
n|S|3 max |Acop|max |Arob|
)
operations, where
max |Acop| is maxs∈S |Acop(s)|, similarly for max |Arob|. The spatial complexity
is O(n|S|).
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Proof. Let an be the number of operations required for computing the recursion
of wn. Assume that computing probabilities Tcop and Trob require unit cost.
Clearly, a0 = 1. In the worst case, when n > 0, all elements of the sets Acop
and Arob must be considered in order to ensure optimality of the actions chosen
and thus max |Arob|max |Acop| operations are required. We always have that
|S| > |{s′ ∈ S | Tcop(s, acop, s′) > 0}| and similarly for Trob(s, arob, s′). Then, in
the worst case,
an ≤ |S|3 max |Arob|max |Acop|+ an−1
≤ n|S|3 max |Acop|max |Arob|+ 1,
where we assumed that all values of wn−1 were saved in memory for all n − 1.
Memorizing those values requires a spatial complexity of O(n|S|) at most. The
final complexity is thus O
(
n|S|3 max |Acop|max |Arob|
)
.
Consequently, both spatial and temporal algorithmic complexities depend on
the three sets S, Acop and Arob. This suggests that these complexities may be
high if the number of available actions is. One could imagine a game in which
actions are paths, resulting in exponential complexity in |S|. Still, whenever
Acop ∈ O(p(|S|)) and Arob ∈ O(q(|S|)) for some polynomials p and q, then
Equation (5) is clearly computable in polynomial time in the size of S. Moreover,
as we will see in Corollary 2.27, wn does not have to be computed for all n in
order to determine if the cops have a winning strategy or not, essentially, n = |S|
suffices. In many studied cases, |S| is itself polynomial in the size of the structure
on which the game is played, leading each time to polynomial time algorithms
for solving the game.
2.6. A stationarity result
In traditional games of Cops and Robbers where a relation n is defined
(such as the classic game [26] and the game with k cops [7]), it is useful to
prove results on the convergence of the recursion n. One demonstrates the
relation becomes stationary, that is, there exists a number N ∈ N such that for
all integers n > N and all pairs of vertices (u, v) ∈ V 2, if u n v, then u n+1 v.
One then writes  for the stationary part of the sequence, i.e. =N . This
result is vital for solving Cops and Robbers games as it ensures the relation 
can be computed in finite time.
Contrary to the relation n found in deterministic Cops and Robbers games
(such as the classic game in Example 2.2), the relation wn does not always be-
come stationary. For example, on the triangle K3, with one cop and one robber,
although it is copwin in the classical sense, whenever one adds a probability of
capture on the vertices, say 1/M forM > 0, then after n turns the cop will have
captured the robber with probability only 1 − (1 − 1M )n. Thus, after n turns,
the cop can only ensure a probability of capture strictly less than 1, although he
can clearly win with probability p for any p ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, a game may
be almost surely copwin, but not c(1, n)-win for any integer n. In the following
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proposition, we formulate and prove an upper bound on the minimal number of
steps n required to determine p∗G , the probability of capture in an infinite game.
Recall that it does not hold in general that in a copwin graph (in the classical
sense of one cop against one robber) every optimal strategy of the cop prevents
him from visiting any vertex more than once [5]. Were this to be true, we
could easily upper bound the capture time of the robber. However, we show
in Lemma 2.25 that a milder version of this result holds for states, instead of
simple cop position.
To have an intuition of why the following lemma is true, it is important to
note that the condition of stationarity is a very strong one. The contraposition of
the lemma may be more informative: the only way for wn to become stationary
is that there is no loop possible in any play following the optimal strategies of
the players. An example of a graph where it does not happen is a cycle of length
3, where the robbers have equal probability in both directions in every state.
There are plays where the robbers are caught after an arbitrary large number
of turns. On the other hand, an acyclic graph does induce stationarity for wn.
Lemma 2.25. Suppose (wn(s))n∈N is stationary at N > 0 in a game G, for a
state s and that the cops and robbers follow their optimal strategy, from Propo-
sition 2.15. Then, every winning play (for the cops) from s brings the cops in
any given state at most once (at the end of a turn).
Proof. We prove the result for both the cops and robbers, that is, in a winning
play where they follow their optimal strategy, none of them visit the same state
twice at their turn. Because of stationarity and Proposition 2.16 the optimal
strategy for the cops in G is also optimal in Gn, n ≥ N . Suppose the lemma is
false. Then there is a winning play pi (i.e., reaching F in N turns or less) from
state s containing a loop through a state sk that is thus reached twice by the
same player in the play, the second time being at sl, k < l (with k and l having
the same parity). This play follows the optimal strategies of the players. None
of the states of the loop are in F by definition of a play. Consider the set Π
of plays pii that start as pi until the first occurence of sl, follow the fragment
slalsl+1 . . . ak−1sk from sl for i times, and then continue as the fragment of pi
after it exits sl = sk the last time. These are plays (in particular, they are
alternating between the players). All these plays are winning (one of them may
be pi), but infinitely many of them reach F at a turn greater than N . If we prove
that these plays follow the optimal strategies, this contradicts stationarity as
the robbers are caught in more than N turns in an infinite number of them,
which implies that the value of GN+k is strictly greater than the value of GN for
infinitely many k.
We do have that any play of Π follows the optimal strategies. Indeed, since
pi follows the optimal memoryless strategyies, everytime the play reaches state
sk = sl, the same action is chosen for the player. In the first occurence, it leads
to enter the loop, in the last one it leads to leave it. This happens when the
action leads to a stochastic next state.
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Note that the lemma is not true if the robbers do not play well. Indeed
consider the very simple deterministic game played on a cycle of length greater
than 3; a robber can avoid capture indefinitiely by traveling away from the cop.
Then (wn(s)n∈N is stationnary for every state s. Consider a play where the
robber decides to stop after having traveled 8 times around the cycle. The play
is winning for the cop, but even if the cop follows the optimal strategy, the same
state is encountered 8 times.
Proposition 2.26. Let G be a GPCR game and s ∈ S. Then, the recursion
wn defined by Equation (5) is such that:
1. if w|S|(s) = 0, then for every k > 0, w|S|+k(s) = 0;
2. if w|S|+1(s) > w|S|(s), then (wn(s))n∈N is not stationary.
Proof. For the first claim, assume that w|S|+k(s) > 0. Then there is a path
from state s to a final state in F that follows σ∗|S|+k (and that has positive
probability). If this path is longer than |S| then it contains a repetition of at
least one state s′, at turns, say, m1, andm2. Consider the finite horizon strategy
that follows σ∗|S|+k for the first m1 turns, and then follows σ
∗
|S|+k−m2 , which is
the strategy followed by σ∗|S|+k when s
′ of pi was encountered for the second
time originally in pi. So removing from pi the subpath between m1 and m2, we
obtain a shorter path that has positive value and that follows this strategy. By
continuing this procedure, we obtain a path of length |S| or less and Claim 1 is
proved.
From Lemma 2.25, if (wn(s))n∈N is stationary from N , there is no (positive,
or winning) plays where the same state is encountered twice in the N first turns
of GN following σ∗N . Now, suppose N ≥ |S|. Thus, there is no repetition of
states, which implies that for all s ∈ S, all paths that contribute to the value
wN (s) are of length at most |S|, and the result follows.
It is interesting to note the contrapositive of the second item in Proposi-
tion 2.26, that if (wn(s))n∈N is stationary for some state s, then w|S|(s) =
w|S|+1(s). In other words, the stationary part starts at most at turn |S|. This
result is by state, so other states may not be stationnary. Note however that
we cannot deduce stationnarity from observing w|S|(s) = w|S|+1(s) because the
sequence may stay stable for a few turns and then be updated with a posi-
tive value. Anyway, we can complete the algorithmic complexity presented in
Proposition 2.24.
Corollary 2.27. In the worst case, under a dynamic programming approach at
most O
(
|S|4 max |Acop|max |Arob|
)
operations are sufficient in order to deter-
mine whether wn is null, stationary equal to a number p ∈ (0, 1] or infinitely
increasing.
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 2.26 and 2.24 by substituting n for
|S|. For stationnarity, for example, if (wn)n∈N is stationnary, then (wn(s))n∈N
is stationnary for all s ∈ S, so we can conclude that (wn)n∈N is stationnary at
n = |S|.
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2.7. Bonato and MacGillivray’s generalized Cops and Robbers game
This subsection is dedicated to our comparison with Bonato and MacGilli-
vray’s generalized Cops and Robbers game [2], which is another attempt at
studying Cops and Robbers games in general forms. For the sake of self-
containment, their model is transcribed here. This model is completely de-
terministic and thus is included as a special case of Definition 2.1.
Bonato and MacGillivray’s game is presented in the following definition.
Definition 2.28 (Bonato and MacGillivray’s game). A discrete time process G
is a generalized Cops and Robbers game if it satisfies the following rules :
1. Two players, pursuer and evader compete against each other.
2. There is perfect information.
3. There is a set PP of admissible positions for the pursuer and a set PE
for the evader. The set of admissible positions of the game is the subset
P ⊆ PP × PE of positions that can be reached according to the rules of
the game. The set of game states is the subset S ⊆ P × {P,E} such
that ((pP , qE), X) ∈ S if, when X is the player next to play, the position
(pP , qE) can be reached by following the rules of the game.
4. For each game state and each player, there exists a non-empty set of al-
lowed movements. Each movement leaves the other player’s position un-
changed. We write AP (pP , qE) the set of allowed movements for the pur-
suer when the game state is ((pP , qE), P ) and AE(pP , qE) for the set of
movements allowed to the evader when the game state is ((pP , qE), E).
5. The rules of the game specify how the game begins. Thus, there ex-
ists a set I ⊆ PP × PE of admissible starting positions. We define
IP = {pP : ∃ qe ∈ PE , (pP , qE) ∈ I} and, for pP ∈ PP , we define the
set IE(pP ) = {qE ∈ PE : (pP , qE) ∈ I}. The game G starts with the pur-
suer choosing a starting position pP ∈ IP and then the evader choosing a
starting position qE ∈ IE(pP ).
6. After both players have chosen their initial positions, the game unfolds
alternatively with the pursuer moving first. Each player, on his turn,
must choose an admissible action given the current state.
7. The rules of the game specify when the pursuer has captured the evader.
In other words, there is a subset F of final positions. The pursuer wins G
if, at any moment, the current position belongs to F . The evader wins if
his position never belongs to F .
Only Cops and Robbers games in which the set P is finite are considered. Games
considered are played on a finite sequence of turns indexed by natural integers
including 0.
We also present how the same authors defined an extension of the relation n
of Nowakowski and Winkler [26] in order to solve the set of games characterized
by their model.
Definition 2.29 (Bonato and MacGillivray’s n). Let G be a Cops and Robbers
game given by Definition 2.28. We let :
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1. qE 0 pP if and only if (pP , qE) ∈ F .
2. Suppose that 0,1, . . . ,i−1 have all been defined for some i ≥ 1. De-
fine qE i pP if (pP , qE) ∈ F or if ((pP , qE), E) ∈ S and for all xE ∈
AE(pP , qE) either (pP , xE) ∈ F or there exists some wP ∈ AP (pP , xE)
such that xE j wP for some j < i.
By definition, i contains i−1 for all i ≥ 1. Since PE × PP are finite, there
exists some t such that t=k for all k ≥ t. We define =t.
Bonato and MacGillivray then use the relation defined in Definition 2.29 to
show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a winning strategy
for the pursuer that is greatly similar to corresponding theorem of Nowakowski
and Winkler [26].
Theorem 2.30 (The copwin theorem of Bonato and MacGillivray). The pur-
suer has a winning strategy in a game of Cops and Robbers characterized by
Definition 2.28 if and only if there exists some pP ∈ IP such that for all
qE ∈ IE(pP ), either (pP , qE) ∈ F or there exists wP ∈ AP (pP , qE) such that
qE  wP .
It should be clear at this point that both Definitions 2.1 and 2.28 describe
alternative pursuit games of perfect information that unfold on discrete struc-
tures. Although the notation is different in both cases, it should also be clear
that Bonato and MacGillivray’s model is embedded in ours. The only differ-
ence between our formalism has to do with the initial states. Indeed, we only
allow one initial state, i0, which is not the case in Definition 2.28. This does
not cause any problem as it suffices to play one more turn in our model, or
even to modify the first reachable states. In order to simplify what follows, we
assume the set of initial states in both models are equivalent. We conclude that
Equation (5) should encode the relation n of Definition 2.29. Indeed, other
than its deterministic character, the relation n is greatly similar to our recur-
sion. Both relations are binary and recursive. Both share the same structure:
a single case when n = 0 in which both players may not make another move; a
second case when n > 0, but the current state is final; finally, a last case, again
when n > 0, when both players must choose an action that is optimal in the
subsequent turns. Thus, we formally show how those two equations are related
in the coming lines.
We first note that Equation (5) can be simplified when following Bonato and
MacGillvray’s model. Since the component so is not used in what follows, we
simply write (c, r) ∈ S. Since the game is deterministic, we let players choose
their next position directly. The recursion wn is thus given by :
w0(c, r) = 1 ⇐⇒ (c, r) ∈ F ;
wn(c, r) =
1, if (c, r) ∈ F ;max
c′∈Acop(c,r)
min
r′∈Arob(c′,r)
wn−1(c′, r′), otherwise. (7)
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The following theorem thus makes the connection between the two for-
malisms that are our model and that of Bonato and MacGillivray. In order
to clarify the exposition, the relation n is written in our model, that of Defi-
nition 2.1. Given the preceding remarks, this should incur no loss of generality.
Theorem 2.31. Let the relation n be given by Definition 2.29 and wn the
recursion given by Equation (5). Assume G is a GPCR game given by Definition
2.1, but following the specifications of Definition 2.28. Then, we have:
wn(c, r) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃ acop ∈ Acop(c, r) : r n c′. (8)
Proof. First, observe that relation n compares the positions of the pursuer
and the evader. These positions are encoded in the game states S of our model.
Moreover, the set of actions A defined in model 2.28 are in fact restrictions of the
set of actions from model 2.1. Indeed, actions in A directly correspond to game
positions, whereas we enable, in definition 2.1, the action sets to be disjoint
from the set of states. It is thus possible to define a game G that respects the
hypotheses of Definition 2.28 and where Expression (8) is well-defined. A subtle
difference between both formalisms has to do with the turn counters: in relation
wn the cops are next to play while the robbers are to make their move in relation
n. This does not change the fact that cops play first in both games. Now, we
prove the result by induction, similarly as in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Base case: n = 0. w0(c, r) = 1 if and only if (c, r) ∈ F and (c, r) ∈ F if and
only if r 0 c.
Induction step. Assume the result holds for n ≤ k and let’s show it for n = k+1.
It holds that wk+1(c, r) = 1 if and only if (c, r) ∈ F , in which case r k+1 c
by definition, or there exists an action c′ ∈ Acop(c, r) for the cops such that no
matter the response r′ ∈ Arob(c′, r) of the robbers, we have wk(c′, r′) = 1. By
the induction hypothesis, we have wk(c′, r′) = 1 if and only if there exists an
action c′′ ∈ Acop(c′, r′) such that r′ k c′′. Thus, if the cops play action c′, they
position themselves on a state in which r k+1 c′. Conversely, assume there
exists an action c′ ∈ Acop(c, r) such that r k+1 c′. Then, by definition, for all
response r′ ∈ Arob(c′, r) of the robbers there exists an action c′′ ∈ Acop(c′, r′)
of the cops such that r′ k c′′. In this case, by the induction hypothesis, we
have wk(c′, r′) = 1. The cops play action c′ ∈ Acop(c, r), in which case we have
wk+1(c, r) = 1.
3. A concrete model of GPCR games
In this section we present a more concrete model of GPCR games that is
closer to the usual definitions in the literature. Thus, we specify that the game
is played on a graph, without pointing out its particular shape. The actions of
the players will correspond to paths as in the game of Cop and Fast Robber
[25]. The game presented in Definition 2.1 is abstract because its sets do not
depend on any precise structure and so neither does the algorithmic complexity
of computing Equation (5). The point of reformulating Definition 2.1 is to refine
some results and formulate them in terms of the graph’s structure.
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3.1. Definition of concrete Cops and Robbers games
In the game presented below, players walk on paths since it appears, in
light of the literature, that such actions are most general. We also grant the
cops a watch zone that enables them to capture the robbers whenever they are
observed. We write P for the set of finite paths in a graph and Pv ⊆ P for the
set of paths that start on vertex v ∈ V . To simplify the notation, we formulate
the concrete model in the setting where there are one cop and one robber, and
without the auxiliary information set So. The extension to the general case is
straightforward.
Definition 3.1. A GPCR game G = (S, i0, F,A, Tcop, Trob) with one cop and
one robber (Definition 2.1) is concrete if there is a graph G = (V,E) satisfying:
1. S = Scop × Srob is a finite set of configurations of the game.
2. i0 = (icop, irob), where icop, irob 6∈ V .
3. Scop ⊆ V ×P(E)∪{icop} is the set of configurations of the cop. The second
coordinate is the cop’s watch zone.
4. Srob ⊆ V ∪ {irob} is the set of positions of the robber.
5. Acop((c, z), r) ⊆ Pc × P(E) is the set of available actions for the cop. He
can move along a path from his present position c and choose a watch zone.
From the initial state, Acop(icop) ⊆ V × P(E).
6. Arob((c, z), r) ⊆ Pr is the set of available actions for the robber. She can
move along a path from her present position r. From the initial state,
Arob(irob) ⊆ V .
The definition of a play and all previous remarks and details that apply to
Definition 2.1 are still applicable in Definition 3.1. A peculiarity here is how
we let the cop have his own watch zone consisting in a set of edges. Thus, the
cop can only capture the robber on the robber’s turn. Indeed, seeing as the
robber moves along paths, we can explicitly deduce at what point a robber is
susceptible to get caught crossing a cop’s watch zone. It’s a natural choice of
modeling that makes writing the probability of capture easier.
3.2. Example: Classic Cop and Robber game
Nowakowski and Winkler’s, and Quilliot’s, game is now presented in the form
of Definition 3.1. In this game, we will consider that the game is over not when
the cop reaches the same position as the robber, but exactly after that, during
the robber’s turn, when she tries to escape. This slightly different interpretation
leads to the same game. Our presentation allows to model and solve a more
general situation where the robber could have a possibility of escaping, even if
the cop reaches the robber’s position. Let G = (V,E) be a finite, undirected,
reflexive and connected graph and let:
Scop = V × P(E)
Srob = V
Acop(c, r) = {([c, c′], Ec′) | [c, c′] ∈ E}.
25
The watch zone Ec′ of the next state is the set of adjacent edges of the cop’s
next position c′. The final states are those in which both players stand on the
same vertex, F = {(c, r) ∈ S : c = r}. The initial state is i0 = (icop, irob) and we
let players choose any vertex from it, that is, Acop(icop, irob) = Arob(c, irob) = V ,
with c ∈ V . Finally, the probabilities of transition are trivial since the game is
deterministic.
Now, in order to show that Equation (5) is well-defined, we demonstrate how
it encodes the relation n of Nowakowski and Winkler [26]. Since the game is
deterministic, Equation (5) reduces to :
w0(c, r) = 1 ⇐⇒ c = r
wn(c, r) = max
c′∈N [c]
min
r′∈N [r]
wn−1(c′, r′). (9)
This equation is also a particular case of Equation (7). The next proposition
shows that Equation (9) simulates the relation n.
Proposition 3.2. It holds that wn(c, r) = 1 if and only if there exists a vertex
c′ ∈ N [c] such that r n c′.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. We note that in recursion wn it is the
cop’s turn to play, while in relation n the robber is next to move.
Base case: n = 0. w0(c, r) = 1 if and only if r = c and r = c if and only if
r 0 c.
Induction step. Assume the result holds for n ≤ k and let us show it holds for
n = k + 1. Then, wk+1(c, r) = 1 if and only if there exists an action c′ for the
cop from which, no matter the response r′ of the robber, we have wk(c′, r′) = 1.
By the induction hypothesis, wk(c′, r′) = 1 if and only if there exists a vertex
c′′ ∈ N [c′] such that r′ k c′′. Thus, the cop can play action c′ ∈ N [c] and we
have r k+1 c′. Conversely, if there exists a vertex c′ ∈ N [c] such that r k+1 c′,
then, by definition, for any action r′ ∈ N [r] of the robber there exist a response
c′′ ∈ N [c] of the cop such that r′ k c′′. By the induction hypothesis, we thus
have wk(c′, r′) = 1. In this case, the cop can play action c′ ∈ N [c] such that,
no matter the answer of the robber r′ ∈ N [r], wk(c′, r′) = 1. By definition, we
thus have wk+1(c, r) = 1.
3.3. Example: Cop and Fast Defending Robber game
Definition 3.1 is further illustrated on the following example. It describes
the game of Cop and Fast Robber with probability of capture, which is a variant
of the one presented by Fomin et al. [10], already mentioned in Example 2.5,
and a variant of Example 2.4, where the robber could evade from capture.
Unsurprisingly, given both games ask of robbers to move along paths, it is
easier to write this new game following Definition 3.1.
For a path pi ∈ P on a graph G, we write pi[k] for its kth vertex and pi[∗] for
its last one. Let G = (V,E) be a finite graph. Assume that the cop guards a
watch zone C ⊂ E and that each time the robber crosses an edge e he survives
his walk with probability qC(e) (between 0 and 1). In Example 2.4, a capture
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probability was used, here we define a survival probability as it is simpler to
use in the current context. Contrary to the Defending Robber game 2.4, the
probability of survival depends on the cop’s watch zone as well as the robber’s
action. Here, only the cop’s watch zone and the transition functions are modified
compared to Example 2.5. So we have an element j∗ /∈ V and the set of final
states are F = {(j∗, ∅, j∗)}. We write Ec for the set of edges incident to c.
Similarly, we write Epi for the set of edges of a path pi. Let:
Tcop((c, Ec, r), c
′) =

δ(c′,Ec′ ,r), if c = icop and c
′ ∈ V
or if c ∈ V and c′ ∈ N [c];
0, otherwise.
The robber’s transition function is given by:
Trob((c, Ec, r), pi) =
{
δ(c,Ec,pi[∗]), if Epi ∩ Ec = ∅;
D(r,pi[∗]), if Epi ∩ Ec 6= ∅;
where D(r,pi[∗]) is a function satisfying:
D(r,pi[∗])(x) =
{∏
e∈Epi qEc(e), if x = (c, Ec, pi[∗]);
1−∏e∈Epi qEc(e), if x = (j∗, ∅, j∗).
Note that to retrieve the game considered in Example 2.5 and Marcoux’s the-
sis [25], we should rather use a watch zone Ec containing all edges on paths
of length 2 from c and change the conditions on Trob for Epi1 ∩ Ec = ∅ and
Epi1 ∩ Ec 6= ∅, where pi1 is the subpath of pi starting in pi[1].
Since the watch zone is determined by the cop’s position, we can use the
simplified notation (c, r) for a state (c, Ec, r). Thus, the recursion of Equation
(5) can be written as follows. For the jail state: wi(j∗, ∅, j∗) = 1 for all i ≥ 0.
For (c, Ec, r) 6= (j∗, ∅, j∗), we have w0(c, r) = 0 and, for n ≥ 1,
wn(c, r) =
max
c′∈N [c]
min
pi∈Pr
Trob((c
′, r), pi, (c′, pi[∗]))wn−1(c′, pi[∗]) + Trob((c′, r), pi, (j∗, j∗)).
Following Proposition 2.24, the algorithmic complexity of the previous re-
cursion is at most O
(
n∆|V |6|P|
)
, where ∆ is the maximal degree of G. Indeed,
S corresponds to the set of pairs of vertices, the cop can only move on his neigh-
bourhood and the robber is allowed to choose any path of finite length. Hence,
even if we restrict the possible paths that can choose the robber to elementary
paths (paths that do not cross twice a same vertex), the size of the possible
robber actions, and therefore the size of P, is exponential in the size of the
graph on which the game is played. However, as shown in the next proposition,
wn can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the graph itself.
Proposition 3.3. Computing wn(i) in the Cop and Fast Defending Robber
game requires at most O
(
|V |3 log|V |+ (n+ 1)|V |2|E|
)
operations and uses at
most O(|V |3) space, for any n ∈ N.
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Proof. Let Pr′r be the set of paths beginning in r and ending in r′. Let (c, Ec) be
a cop position. The robber’s transition function can be simplified by assuming
qEc(e) = 1 if e /∈ Ec. Then, Trob((c, r), pi, (c, pi[r′])) = Πe∈EpiqEc(e) if the robber
is not caught on pi[r′]. The previous recursion, when state (c, r) is not final, can
be simplified to:
wn(c, r) = max
c′∈N [c]
min
r′∈V
pi∈Pr′r
( ∏
e∈Epi
qEc′ (e)wn−1(c
′, r′) + 1−
∏
e∈Epi
qEc′ (e)
)
.
= max
c′∈N [c]
min
r′∈V
pi∈Pr′r
(
(wn−1(c′, r′)− 1)
∏
e∈Epi
qEc′ (e) + 1
)
.
If c′ and r′ are fixed, we look for the path pi minimizing the expression in
parentheses, so maximizing
∏
e∈Epi qEc′ (e). This is the same path that maxi-
mizes
∑
e∈Epi log qEc′ (e) because log is a monotone increasing function. Because
log qEc′ (e) < 0, with qEc′ (e) ∈ [0, 1], we can minimize
∑
e∈Epi − log qEc′ (e).
Observe that the survival probabilities qEc′ (e) depend only on the vertex
c′ and the edge e. Thus, prior to evaluating wn(c, r), we can precompute
|V | all-pairs shortest paths (one for each possible cop position) by weighting
each edge e ∈ E with − log qEx(e) for each source x ∈ V . This is done in
O
(
|E||V |2 + |V |3 log|V |
)
operations, for example by using the algorithm of
Fredman and Tarjan [12]. This takes O
(
|V |3
)
space (because the path does
not have to be stored, it can be recomputed in O(∆|V |)). Thus, for each c′ we
store the values
∏
e∈Epi qEc′ (e) for the shortest path pi between r and r
′. Finding
the next robber position r′ thus requires at most O(|V |) operations.
Now, assume wn−1(c′, r′) is computed for all c′, r′, in time an−1. We look
for the vertex c′ ∈ N [c] maximizing
min
r′∈V
pi∈Pr′r
(
(wn−1(c′, r′)− 1)
∏
e∈Epi
qEc′ (e) + 1
)
.
The values wn−1(c′, r′) are already computed, as well as the
∏
e∈Epi qEc′ (e)’s.
Thus, at mostO(|N [c]||V |) operations are required to evaluate expression wn(c, r)
when c and r are fixed. To find all maxima, that is for all c ∈ V and r ∈ V , we
need to make at most O
(
|V |∑c∈|V ||N [c]|) = O(2|V ||E|) operations. On turn
n, we make a number of operations an ∈ O(|V ||E|) + an−1 ⊆ O(n|V ||E|). The
total complexity is thus:
O
(
|E||V |2 + |V |3 log|V |
)
+ an = O
(
(n+ 1)|E||V |2 + |V |3 log|V |
)
.
The bottlenecks for the spatial complexity are the shortest path algorithms
which require at most O
(
|V |3
)
space. For each wn we only need wn−1 so we
do not need to store any other wk for k < n− 1.
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An important aspect of the fast robber game is its ability to model situ-
ations of imperfect information in which the cops only gather information on
the robber’s position at regular intervals. This game, deemed with witness, is
shown by Chalopin et al. [6] to correspond to the game of Cop and Fast Robber
(without watch zone). In essence, the authors present an equivalence between
the classes of copwin graphs in the witness game and in the fast robber one.
We can wonder if the same could be said of the stochastic case.
3.4. Example: Cop and Drunk Robber game
Let us revisit the Cop and Drunk Robber game of Example 2.3 with the
concrete model and Equation (5).
We can show how it is always easier to capture a robber moving randomly
than a robber playing optimally. For the sake of generality, assume the robber
can play according to any distribution in DistN [r] when she finds herself on
vertex r. Let φ ⊆ (DistN [r])r∈V be a sequence of distributions on the vertices
V and φr its component that is in DistN [r]. Then, we write wφn(c, r) for the
recursion in which Trob((c, r), r′) = φr. In other words, we write:
wφn(c, r) = max
c′∈N [c]
∑
r′∈N [r]
φr(r
′)wφn−1(c
′, r′), (10)
if c 6= r and wφn(c, r) = 1 if c = r, for all n ≥ 0. The classic recursion from
Equation (9) is written wn(c, r).
Proposition 3.4. It is always easier to capture a robber playing randomly than
an adversarial one, that is:
wφn(c, r) ≥ wn(c, r).
Proof. We write δN [r] for the set of Dirac distributions defined on N [r]. The
robber would be harder to capture if she were to minimize her probability of cap-
ture only on Dirac distributions because her optimal strategy is deterministic.
Thus, we compute
wφn(c, r) := max
c′∈N [c]
∑
r′∈N [r]
φr(r
′)wφn−1(c
′, r′)
≥ max
c′∈N [c]
min
ψ⊆(DistN[r])r∈V
∑
r′∈N [r]
ψr(r
′)wψn−1(c
′, r′)
= max
c′∈N [c]
min
ψ⊆(δN[r])r∈V
∑
r′∈N [r]
ψr(r
′)wψn−1(c
′, r′)
= max
c′∈N [c]
min
r′∈N [r]
wn−1(c′, r′).
The first line is the definition of Equation (10) with the robber playing according
to distribution φ. If she could choose this distribution, she could fall on a
distribution ψ ⊆ (DistN [r])r∈V ensuring her a greater probability of survival,
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that justifies the second line. Then, we observe that since her optimal strategy is
deterministic, it corresponds to a sequence of Dirac distributions and she loses
nothing in playing according to ψ ⊆ (δN [r])r∈V . The last line is simply the
preceding one rewritten without distributions, as in this case ψr is concentrated
on a single vertex r′ ∈ N [r].
3.5. Example: Temporal Cop and Robber game
In graph theory, one can define many random processes to stochastically
generate graphs that vary on each time step. One thus obtains a sequence of
graphs G0, G1, . . . that represents the evolution of a network over time. Those
graphs are called dynamic graphs, link streams, time-varying graphs or tempo-
ral networks, depending on the community, and can model, for example, the
destruction of a bridge or of a road that makes it impossible for the players to
pass through it.
Suppose k cops are chasing l robbers on the sequence G0, G1, . . . . In order
to take into account the variable nature of the underlying structure of a game
from Definition 3.1, we can make use of the component So as a turn counter.
Let Gt = (Vt, Et) be the graph generated at time t,
St = V
k
t × P(Et)k × V lt × {t}
and S =
⋃∞
t=1 St. Hence, on each time step t a new graphGt is created according
to a certain process and the set of states is renewed. The sets of actions can
also be redefined. Let PGtu be the set of finite paths on Gt that begin on vertex
u ∈ Vt. The sets of actions are thus :
Acop(c, C, r, t) ⊆
k∏
i=1
PGtci × P(Et);
Arob(c, C, r, t) ⊆
l∏
i=1
PGtri .
Since this example is rather general, we let the transition functions be undefined.
We require, however, that the transition functions follow the arrow of time: if
st ∈ St is a game state at time t and acop ∈ Acop(st) is a cop action, then
Tcop(st, acop)(X) > 0 only if X ⊆ St+1. The same holds for the robbers.
4. Conclusion
This paper presented a relatively simple yet very general model in order
to describe games of Cops and Robbers that, notably, may include stochastic
aspects. The game G was presented along with a method of resolution in the
form of a recursion wn in Theorem 2.13. We show in Proposition 2.16 that we
can always retrieve an -optimal strategy for G from the recursion wn (for large
enough n). Moreover, in Proposition 2.26 we show that if the recursion becomes
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stationary, stationarity must occur at most at index |S|. This is a first step in
the analysis of the rate of convergence of the recursion.
We have exposed how some classic Cops and Robbers games can be writ-
ten into our model and extended. Many more games could now be studied as
GPCR such as the Firefighting game, under certain conditions, in which a team
of firefighters seeks to prevent the nodes of a graph from burning. An interest-
ing notion that is captured by our framework, in Definition 3.1, is that of the
surveillance zones of the cops that can be chosen at each step. Thus, we claim
a wide variety of games of Cops and Robbers can be solved with the concepts
developed in this paper. Furthermore, such a broad exposition of games of Cops
and Robbers as ours enables one to study the effects of modifying certain rules,
for example on the number of cops or on the speed of players, on the games.
That is, one can use Equation (5) and probe its values in order to test how
modifying these rules affect the ability of the cops to capture the robbers.
We have extended the classic notion of cop number with the p-cop number,
although the question is still open about the behaviour of this function. The
expected capture time of the robbers is also of great interest. This function
can now be studied on large swaths of Cops and Robbers games. In part,
this question can be motivated by a Simard et al.’s paper [31] on the relation
between an Operations Research problem and the resolution of a Cop and Drunk
Robber game. Specifically, the authors tackled the problem of upper bounding
the probability of detecting a hidden and randomly moving object on a graph
with a single optimally moving searcher. This problem, being NP-hard [32],
is constrained to be solved in a maximum number of time steps T ∈ N. In
particular, it appears that if one could tightly upper bound the expected capture
time of a game derived from Definition 2.1, then one could, following the ideas
presented in this paper, deduce the optimal number of searchers to send on a
mission to rescue the object. Then, if this number were deduced, one could
further apply the ideas of this article along with Equation (5) in order to help
solve this search problem with multiple searchers.
Finally, a last avenue of research that is worth mentioning and that is possi-
bly of most interest to researchers in robotics and operations research concerns
the extension of model 2.1 to games of imperfect information. Imperfect in-
formation refers to the lack of knowledge of one or both players. Cops and
Robbers games of imperfect information thus contain games in which robbers
are invisible, that can model problems of graph search such as the one men-
tioned above. Game theory seems apt to enable the transition from perfect
information to imperfect information games with the use of belief states. Such
generalization could be paired with the branch and bound method presented in
Simard et al. [31] in order to solve more general search problems.
In light of the literature on Cops and Robbers games it appears this paper
distances itself from most studies on the subject. Indeed, we do not claim any
results on typical Cops and Robbers questions such as the asymptotic behaviour
of cp(G) or on dismantling schemes to characterize classes of winning graphs.
However, we think that modelling such a wide variety of games opens the door
to further studies on Cops and Robbers games that can now be tackled in their
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generality, which was not possible before. Thus, although our model may not
enable one to compute analytical solutions on classical questions of Cops and
Robbers games, we have good hope that algorithmic ones will be devised in
order to solve more general problems on classes, not of graphs, but of games.
In short, it appears that new and promising avenues of research have come to
light with the objects presented in this paper and we hope researchers will be
driven to tackle those open questions that were unearthed.
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Appendices
A. Constructing a GPCR game as a Simple Stochastic Game
The following argument is inspired by the SSG exposition of Gimbert and
Horn [13]. A simple stochastic game is a tuple (V, Vmax, Vmin, VR, E, t, p), where
(V,E) describes a directed graph G and Vmax, Vmin, VR form a partition of V .
There is a special vertex t ∈ V , called the target, and p is a probability function
such that for every vertex w ∈ V and v ∈ VR, p(w | v) is the probability of
transiting from v to w. There are two players, max and min, and the game is
played with perfect information. The set Vmax contains those nodes controlled
by player max, i.e. where this player is next to play, and Vmin those nodes
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controlled by player min. The set of edges E is defined by the possible moves
in the game. The game proceeds as follows: imagine a token is placed on some
initial vertex i ∈ Vmax ∪ Vmin, then the player who is next to play moves the
token along an edge, either the token is again in some vertex of Vmax ∪ Vmin
where one player has to make a move, or the token is now on some vertex v of
VR. When the token is on v, an outneighbour of v is chosen randomly according
to the distribution p(· | v), where the token is moved. The game ends if t is ever
encountered, in which case max wins, otherwise it continues indefinitely and the
other player wins.
Following Gimbert and Horn, we define a play as an infinite sequence of
vertices v0v1 . . . of G such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i and a finite play (what
we called a history) as a finite prefix of a play. A strategy for max is a function
σ : V ∗Vmax → V and a strategy for min is a function τ : V ∗Vmin → V , where
V ∗ is the set of finite plays. We suppose that for each finite play (v0 . . . vn)
and vertex v ∈ Vmax, (v, σ(v0 . . . vnv) ∈ E and similarly for τ . Note that such
strategies are deterministic, which is without loss of generality. We write for
convenience Γmax and Γmin for the sets of max (resp. min) strategies. Now,
for any node v ∈ V , we can define the value of v for max (resp. min) as the
probability the target node is reached from that node. If p(t | σ, τ, v) is the
probability that t is reached from v under strategies σ and τ , then we let
val(v) := sup
σ∈Γmax
inf
τ∈Γmin
p(t | σ, τ, v),
val(v) := inf
τ∈Γmin
sup
σ∈Γmax
p(t | σ, τ, v).
The following theorem [8, 13, 30] is well known about simple stochastic
games.
Theorem A.1. In any simple stochastic game and from any vertex v, val(v) =
val(v) and we write val(v) := val(v). Furthermore, there exists deterministic
and memoryless strategies for players max and min that achieve the value val(v).
We write a GPCR game G as a simple stochastic game by describing a
directed graph G = (V = Vcop ∪ Vrob ∪ VR ∪ {t} , E), where Vcop is the set of
vertices controlled by the cops, Vrob the set of vertices controlled by the robbers,
VR is the set of random vertices and t is the target vertex for the cops. The
set of edges E is induced by the transition functions Tcop and Trob. If there
exists a play in G with a subsequence sas′, then we add an edge from s to
some node v ∈ VR, labelled a. We add an edge from a to s′ weighted either
by Tcop(s, a, s′) or Trob(s, a, s′) depending on whether a was played by the cops
or by the robbers. We assume that vertex t holds all final states of F , thus
all transitions of the form Tcop(s, a, f) > 0 or Trob(s, a, f) > 0 for any state s,
action a and final state f , induce edges from some vertex of VR to t. Now, in
this game the cops win if and only if they can reach t from the initial vertex i0.
Thus, this is a simple stochastic game that corresponds to G. We deduce from
Theorem A.1 that val(v) exists and it is the probability that the cops capture
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the robbers from a vertex, or state, v in G. Since this SSG has a value, so does
G and this value is the probability just mentioned.
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